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ABSTRACT

The study examined principal input in decisions affecting administrative compensation through the framework of a state-mandated meet-and-discuss model. The model seeks to strengthen management team relationships while guaranteeing administrators a minimal level of participation. The following are discussed: (1) conceptual and empirical underpinnings; (2) participative decision-making; (3) pay design; (4) the Pennsylvania Meet and Discuss Model for determining administrative compensation; and (5) the design and methodology of the study. From a sample of 420 elementary and secondary principals, responses were received from 341 (80.5 percent) administrators. The findings confirmed that administrator involvement in the determination of wages, salaries, or fringe benefits resulted in more positive attitudes of organizational loyalty and satisfaction. The study revealed that designing administrative compensation through the framework of a state-mandated meet-and-discuss model exerted positive influences on school climates and work relationships among principals, superintendents, and school board members. Factors affecting the research is discussed. A nine-page bibliography is included. (SI)

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Administrative Compensation:

A Study of Principal Input Through the Framework of a State-Mandated Model

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Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the

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Administrative Compensation: A Study of Principal Input Through the Framework of a State-Mandated Model

INTRODUCTION

The involvement of school administrators in decisions affecting their wages, salaries, fringe benefits, or other terms of employment is a provocative issue (Anderson, 1970; Degnan, 1972; Salmon, 1972; Wagstaff, 1973; Smith, 1973a; Dempsey, 1975; Sinclair, 1977; Pisapia & Sells, 1978; LeCesne, 1980; Caldwell & Paul, 1983a; Mayher, 1984; Lebda, 1987a).

Historically, methods for determining administrator compensation varied along a continuum of self-interest, participative opportunity. At one extreme, traditional approaches relied upon unilateral processes marked by single-minded school board decision making. In contrast, bilateral decision making represented by collective bargaining provided greater opportunity for administrator input. Other formal mechanisms without negotiations or contracts emerged as alternatives including the use of meet and discuss procedures (Kimbrough & Nunnery, 1976; Pisapia, 1980; Caldwell, 1984; Paul, 1985; Lebda, 1986a).

Advocates for expanded involvement argued that mutual benefits resulted for administrators and the school organization. From an administrator's perspective, higher salaries, more liberal fringe benefits, enhanced status and recognition, effective communications with superiors, and

improved job security were anticipated (Barea, 1977; Caldwell & Paul, 1984). School districts, too, benefitted through the cultivation of trusting, personally rewarding, and efficient work climates. Greater involvement by administrators in pay decisions contributed to more pleasant and productive work climates (Nasstrom & Pier, 1983; Caldwell, 1984).

Opponents countered with the notion that, although some aspects of an administrator's personal condition may be improved, disadvantages nonetheless existed for administrators and schools. Increased participation failed to guarantee meaningful decision making roles or improved communications (Knoester, 1978). And, one could expect strained, bureaucratic, and dysfunctional relationships as the formality of participation approached the level of collective bargaining (Smith, 1973b; Kanner, 1977; Karlitz, 1978; Hahn, 1981). Furthermore greater participation was cited as a major challenge to the traditional authority of school boards in the realm of employee compensation development (Lee, 1979; PSBA, 1981; Lebda, 1987b). Finally, opponents insisted that expanded self-interest involvement was a threat to management team structures (Anderson, 1970; Starr, 1971; Salmon, 1972; Nasstrom & Pier, 1983).

Should school administrators actively participate in self-interest wage and benefit determinations? What advantages accrue for the administrator? And, will participative pay design enhance the school organization?

These questions formed the basis for the present study which examined principal input in decisions affecting administrative compensation through the framework of a state-mandated meet and discuss model that sought to strengthen management team relationships while guaranteeing administrators a minimal level of particpation.

Conceptual and Empirical Underpinnings

The participation of workers in organizational decisions is a relevant integrative strategy that contributes to healthy, rewarding, and productive climates (Ouchi, 1981; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Lewis, 1985; Lawler, 1986). When combined with elements of motivation theory, decision making theory formed the conceptual base for this study. It was bolstered further by mounting empirical evidence in the private and public sectors resulting in an emergent paradigm suggesting that self-interest participation by principals in economic and welfare issues was associated with higher levels of satisfaction, trust, and loyalty to school organizations.

Participative Decision Making

Participation in organizational decisions, its impact on participants, and organizational effectiveness have been frequently addressed topics in the literature (Rothlesberger & Dickson, 1939; Lewin, 1952; Likert, 1961, 1967; Maier, 1963; Bridges, 1967; Lowin, 1968; Strauss & Rubenstein, 1970; Vroom & Yetton, 1973; Maple, 1977; Locke & Schweiger,

1979; Duke, Showers, & Imber, 1980; Conway, 1984; Hoy & Sousa, 1984).

Described alternately as collaborative, shared, consultative, delegated, or participative decision making, the involvement of employees in work decisions was the source of intense investigation. But, as Hoy and Sousa (1984) reported, common use of the term failed to generate definitional consensus. American writers, for example, portrayed the technique as a managerial style while European counterparts categorized it as a state mechanism (Likert, 1967; Schregle, 1976; Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Cordova, 1982). Others emphasized the element of group involvement (Davis, 1967), joint determination of common interest (Vroom, 1960), and delegation of authority (Sashkin, 1976; Hoy & Sousa, 1984). In the present study, participative decision making was defined as the consultative self-interest involvement of school administrators (principals and assistant principals) in decisions affecting wages, salaries, or fringe benefits.

Generally speaking, research in the private and public sectors established a firm empirical base supporting worker involvement in organizational decisions. Numerous studies associated participative management with improvements in employee morale, work group and hierarchical communications, as well as productivity. And, these conclusions were consistent with decision making and motivation theory. Argyris (1964), Vroom and Yetton (1973), and Maier (1963) contended that greater understanding, acceptance, and commitment to

decisions resulted when employees were involved. Furthermore, worker participation contributed to the satisfaction of an employee's higher order needs including self-actualization which encompassed the need for achievement, recognition, self-direction, and creativity (Maslow, 1954; Herzberg, 1966; Alderfer, 1972).

In the private sector, social science research confirmed the importance of participative management. Beginning with the famous Hawthorne Studies, which drew attention to the social dimension of worker behavior, it was discovered that economic incentives were not the most crucial motivators and that group processes frequently influenced worker attention to management concerns (Hoy & Miskel, 1978). Other researchers including McCormick (1938), Lewin (1947), Coch and French (1948), Marrow (1967), Dowling (1975), and Donnelly (1977) provided further insights into the positive effects of participative decision-making techniques. Too, greater trust, satisfaction, loyalty, and increased productivity were linked to participative management in studies of Japanese worklife (Ouchi, 1981) and America's most successful corporations (Peters & Waterman, 1982). Finally, a recent study of Quality Circle programs in American industry (Marks, Mirvis, Hackett, & Grady, 1986) underscored the findings of Beardsley and Dewar (1977) and Yeager (1979) who declared that participative decision making stimulated improved working conditions and work quality.

In the public sector, research in education focused heavily upon the participative involvement of teachers in school decisions. The fostering of high quality decisions along with the propensity of teachers to accept and implement participative decisions were dominant themes (Bartunek & Keys, 1979). Various elements of shared decision making were examined by Duke, Showers, and Imber (1980), Imber (1983), and Conway (1984). Other researchers provided empirical support for the conclusion that teacher collaboration in school decision making was positively associated with job satisfaction, trust, conflict resolution, reduced levels of teacher alienation and militancy, and student achievement (Haynes, 1972; Smallridge, 1972; Belasco, 1973; Byrnes, 1973; Key, 1974; Shaw, 1976; Hoy & Sousa, 1984). But, as Bartunek and Keys (1979) noted, maximizing the benefits of teacher involvement required that specific decisions were matched to an appropriate type and level of participation, a cooperative orientation existed throughout the process, and dispute resolution occurred within a cooperative context thereby resulting in consensus and information sharing.

Empirical findings in the private and public sectors, however, were preoccupied until recently with the implications of employee involvement in organizational decisions. Given the importance attached to compensation development, and increased recognition of the pervasive role played by

principals in school effectiveness, the self-interest involvement of middle-level educational managers has gained the attention of researchers and contributed to a shift in thought.

PAY DESIGN

Compensation development is an important organizational task (Castetter, 1981; Caldwell, Hertzog, Riddle, & Steinhart, 1981; McMillan & Williams, 1982; Caldwell, 1986; Tracy & Sheehan, 1987).

Decisions affecting wages, salaries, and fringe benefits have widespread consequences for an organization and the people that it employs. First, compensation is a large cost with high internal and external visibility. Second, pay design influences worker behaviors that impact on overall effectiveness, exerts both an individual and collective effect on worker behavior, and relates to employee satisfaction. Finally, compensation affects the ability of an organization to attract, motivate, and retain talented employees (Castetter, 1981; Tracy & Sheehan, 1987; Lebda, 1987b).

Traditionally, socio-cultural and historical attitudes mitigated against worker involvement in pay decisions. Opposition originated from a core of assumptions related to the concept of governmental sovereignty, a strong belief in the innate tendency of mankind to maximize self-interest, and the fear of advesarial relationships (Ritchie, 1976; Lee, 1979; Bass & Shackleton, 1979; Paul, 1985).

Research findings in the private sector, however, challenged these assumptions. Lawler and Hackman (1969) and Scheflen, Lawler, and Hackman (1971) examined a management wage incentive plan and discovered that active worker involvement was associated with lower absentee rates. Likewise, Lawler and Cammann (1972) noted that worker participation in wage incentive plans produced positive effects on productivity. Employee groups experiencing the highest levels of participation in decision-making responded more favorably to management initiatives. Lawler (1975, 1981) and Jenkins and Lawler (1981) reported that worker participation in self-interest decisions failed to generate unrealistic demands or expectations and related to positive perceptions of job satisfaction, managerial trust, and pay satisfaction.

In the public sector, studies of administrative compensation produced similar findings. Ladd (1977) reported that role clarification and welfare issues were major factors underlying the belief that middle management should band together to promote self-interest concerns. Burton (1977), who surveyed superintendents and principals, discovered that principal attitudes toward working conditions were more positive when administrative bargaining units existed. Bain (1980) noted that collective bargaining for administrators was a growing phenomena in Wyoming and Illinois. This writer acknowledged that, when states enacted collective bargaining statutes, all administrators including principals and superintendents should be involved.

Gabbert (1982) observed that perceptual differences existed between middle and top management when union and non-union conditions were examined. And, Kirkwood (1986) disclosed findings suggesting that administrator perceptions toward school boards and superintendents influenced union affiliation attitudes.

Further research documented the impact of principal participation in wage and benefit determinations. LeCesne (1980) observed that the use of formal input procedures in Michigan schools was associated with more positive perceptions of organizational harmony. Bonzell (1981), who studied the attitudes of elementary principals in California, concluded that formalized participation through administrative bargaining unions related to more positive perceptions of job security and satisfaction as well as improved communications with superintendents and school boards. Better communications with top management was also cited by Sweeney and Rowedder (1980) as a perceived outcome of middle management bargaining. They further observed that role clarification, larger salaries, increased job security, more positive principal morale, and greater involvement in decisions were associated with bilateral compensation determinations.

Caldwell, Hertzog, Riddle, and Steinhart (1981), Caldwell and Paul (1984), and Paul (1985) reported positive relationships between formalized input, role clarification,

and interactions with teachers, administrators, and the community in Pennsylvania school districts. Williams (1985) concluded that formal collective bargaining or informal meet and discuss interactions generated a positive impact on principal perceptions toward working conditions including salary and fringe benefits, autonomy, communications, and role clarification. Lebda (1987a) noted positive relationships between the use of formal and informal participative procedures and principal perceptions of satisfaction and loyalty, particularly when the school board posture supported management team structures. Finally, Cardone (1987) discovered significant relationships between principal commitment to the organization and the use of written pay agreements or comprehensive policy statements.

Much of the research supporting principal participation in compensation development came in the wake of a growing movement toward administrator unionization. The growth of administrator unions was described in the literature as a "forest fire in a drought" (Cooper, 1979) and "the unique development in public sector labor relations" (Caldwell & Paul, 1983a). Between 1975-1980, the number of administrator bargaining units rose from 1100 to 1838 representing approximately 14 percent of the nation's public schools (Bridges & Cooper, 1976; Cooper, 1979; Cooper & Murrman, 1982; Cooper & Nakamura, 1983).

Although the movement toward unionization may have moderated, the increasing desire of school principals to

participate in self-interest determinations, a growing body of empirical evidence supporting participation, and elements of decision making and motivation theory underscored the importance of developing organizational pay through a process that offered meaningful principal input.

THE MODEL

Passed in 1984, Act 93 amended Pennsylvania's Public School Code thereby incorporating a method for determining administrative compensation (Pennsylvania Compensation Plans for School Administrators Act, 1984). This legislation, which ushered a new era in middle management labor relations, created a unique approach to compensation development for school principals and supervisors. It initiated a change from voluntary conditions marked by wide variability in participation, to a mandatory climate in which the issue of administrative compensation was addressed through the framework of expanded principal input while supporting a management team philosophy.

Under previous voluntary conditions, traditional approaches to administrative pay design and collective bargaining coexisted. Thus, a continuum of input procedures ranged from formal negotiations to restricted or nonexistent opportunities for principal involvement. And, in at least one study, nearly 50 percent of responding administrators lacked written descriptions of their wages, salaries, fringe benefits or other terms and conditions of employment (Caldwell & Paul, 1983b). Additionally, as Paul (1985)

discovered, approximately 1 in 4 school districts operating under voluntary conditions denied opportunities for principal participation.

Mandatory meet and discuss, on the other hand, triggered a major alteration in the labor relations climate of this state. Simplicity was the most striking feature of the model. School boards were granted wide latitude in determining the nature of meet and discuss activities, but a minimal level of administrator participation was established. The statute required:

* school board enactment of a written pay plan for administrators including the process used in determining compensation, salary or salary schedules, and a listing of fringe benefits;
* meet and discuss interactions in advance of plan approval provided that a majority of school administrators requested participation;
* resolution of disputes through fact finding mechanisms administered by the state department of education and obviating work stoppages.

As depicted in Figure 1, this model typically involved four stages. They included: (1) initiating activities; (2) development; (3) execution/adjustment; (4) recycling.

First, initiation of the process resulted from a formal, written request for meet and discuss by a majority of eligible district administrators. Consistent with estab-



Figure 1.

Pennsylvania Meet and Discuss Model for Determining Administrative Compensation

lished concepts in school and labor law (Pisapia, 1980; Lareau, 1980), eligible administrators included first-level supervisors not already covered by the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act (1970). Professional and non-professional positions fit the definition. Principals, assistant principals, subject supervisors, food service directors, and head custodians were considered eligible to participate. Specifically excluded were the highest ranking school employees (superintendent and assistant superintendent), local title variations (human services director), as well as business managers and personnel directors. During the initial year of implementation, and despite a clear legislative intent to the contrary, 14.5 and 17.5 percent of 275 compensation plans analyzed by Caldwell (1986) included superintendents and business managers respectively.

Second, the development stage related to those activities that established a suitable groundwork for meet and discuss, contributed to meaningful interactions supporting management team structures, and resulted in the enactment of a written administrative compensation plan. At this stage, the flexible nature of the model was evident. Both the form and content of meet and discuss interactions were left to the discretion of school boards and principals in each local district. As Caldwell (1986) further noted, nearly 7 in 10 principals experienced formal or informal procedures with the board while approximately 1 in 4 principals engaged in an informal process with the central office. Additionally,

only 1 in 10 principals surveyed indicated that a lack of input opportunity existed. Content items, which varied as a function of local inclination, frequently included salary, evaluation, team management philosophy, professional dues, life and liability insurance, physical examinations, and retirement benefits (Caldwell, 1986).

Third, execution of the plan including an adjustment component was an integral part of the model. Plan implementation necessarily involved execution of decisions in good faith demonstrated jointly by principals and school boards. Important to successful implementation was the timely notice by boards of the components established in written compensation plans. During the initial two years of Act 93 meet and discuss, nearly 2 in 10 administrators were not given an assigned salary by the beginning of the school year while 1 in 10 administrators remained uninformed as late as October or beyond (Caldwell, 1987). Conventional wisdom suggests that delays of this type generate confusion and attitudes of dissatisfaction among school administrators which, in the long term, undermine positive management team relationships.

When disputes arose, three primary methods of conflict resolution existed. Further clarification and refinement through continued meet and discuss interactions was the first option. In cases where boards failed to adopt written compensation plans, or the adopted plans included inappro-

priate elements, administrators could seek mandamus relief through the courts. However, Act 93 legislation specified use of fact finding to resolve disputes, and it prohibited administrators from the withholding of services in accordance with the Pennsylvania Public Employe Anti-Strike Law (1947).

Fact finding consisted of an eight-step process beginning with a determination of need and culminating with a final report. Intermediate steps included pre-fact finding actions, presentation of the grievance, establishment of a panel, panel meetings, declaration of an impasse, and the public hearing. Copies of the written report were to be submitted within 30 days to the governor, state legislature, and local district resulting in administrative remedies or, where appropriate, legislative action (Manchester, 1985).

To date, the use of fact finding was minimal. Only 30 districts invoked some aspect of the process while 5 such cases resulted in court intervention that upheld the administrative position. Of the remaining 25 cases, a clear majority of disputes were resolved prior to creation of the fact finding panel (PAESP, 1981).

Finally, the model included a recycling stage linking implementation/conflict resolution to a new round of meet and discuss. Although the law required only a minimal duration of one year for the written plan, districts were permitted to enact multi-year plans. The recycling stage also created new opportunities to reasses previous exper-

iences. Hard work and careful preparation during this stage were essential to further growth and refinement of the model. Insights gained through review and analysis served as important sources of information in preparation for the next series of meet and discuss encounters.

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study was to investigate relationships between specific procedures used in public schools operating under a state-mandated meet and discuss model for determining administrative compensation (wages and benefits) and the perceptions of middle-level managers (principals and assistant principals) toward selected working relationships.

Public elementary and secondary schools in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were the focus of the investigation. Initially, all 501 school districts providing educational services to more than 1.5 million students were considered for inclusion (Pennsylvania Education Directory, 1984; Pennsylvania Department of Education, 1985). But given the known variation in district pay activities (Caldwell, 1982; Caldwell & Paul, 1983b, Paul, 1985), random selection of cases from the general population would not necessarily generate a representative sample (Kerlinger, 1973; Sellitz, Wrightsman, & Cook, 1976; Borg & Gall, 1979).

Excluding the highly urbanized school districts of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, a purposive sample of 420 elementary and secondary school principals or assistant principals employed throughout 120 local districts was construct-

ed. District size, wealth, and geographic location were considered in the selection of representative schools. Data were reported by 341 administrators constituting a high rate of return (80.5 percent) which included usable returns from 192 secondary administrators and 149 elementary principals.

Each respondent received a Project Survey Instrument that collected demographic, procedural, and attitudinal information. Demographic data related to school and principal variables. School variables included district and building enrollment, wealth, and the number of administrators employed by the district. Principal variables consisted of present age, salary level, years in administration, years in current position, and the number of staff supervised.

Procedural data concerned the district's meet and discuss process, the school board's posture or spirit demonstrated during plan development, and the amount of time spent by principals or principal teams in meet and discuss. Four distinct categories of self-interest input were constructed: (1) formal sessions with the board; (2) informal sessions with the board; (3) meetings with the superintendent; (4) no input, formal or informal. Board posture was also examined through use of a four-category construct: (1) supported management team philosophy; (2) complied with the law's intent; (3) allowed little input; (4) manipulated/

avoided the mandate by denying participative opportunity. The amount of time spent in the process was reported in actual number of hours expended while preparing for or participating in meet and discuss activities.

Attitudinal information concerned principal perceptions toward selected organizational variables. Subsets were constructed for each of the following variables: (1) loyalty to the board; (2) loyalty to the superintendent; and (3) pay satisfaction. Responses were recorded on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1). A total instrument reliability coefficient of alpha was calculated at .870. Alpha measures for individual subsets included: (1) board loyalty (.831); (2) superintendent loyalty (.828); and (3) pay satisfaction (.815). In addition, principal satisfaction with meet and discuss as well as satisfaction with previous pay design experiences were included in the attitudinal data set.

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS-X) was used to treat collected data. Univariate and bivariate statistical tools included percentages, frequencies, means, standard deviations, correlation, one-way analysis of variance, and Tukey Pair-Wise Contrasts. The .05 level of confidence was selected as the test for statistical significance.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The findings of this study confirmed previous re-

search. Administrator involvement in the determination of wages, salaries, or fringe benefits resulted in more positive attitudes of organizational loyalty and satisfaction. Self-interest participation in economic and welfare issues provided a credible means for enhancing the status and morale of building principals. Furthermore, the study revealed that designing administrative compensation through the framework of a state-mandated meet and discuss model exerted positive influences on school climates and work relationships among principals, superintendents, and school board members.

RESPONDENT PROFILE

The typical administrator was a building principal whose age averaged 47 years with 14 years of experience in administration and 9 years of experience in the current position. And, this principal supervised approximately 44 staff members in districts with an average of 5 administrators. During the year in question, a mean salary level of $37,466.52 was reported by respondents. In preparation for meet and discuss, principals and principal teams expended 6.1 and 8.8 hours respectively. Approximately 3.7 hours were spent by principals in meet and discuss interactions while principal teams averaged 4.4 hours in various session formats.

Administrators who responded to the survey reflected a nearly even distribution between elementary and secondary levels of the school organization: elementary (44%); middle

school (13%); junior high (6%); secondary (13%); and senior high (24%). They were employed by districts with an average enrollment of 4224 pupils and a 53.3 percent state reimbursement rate for allowable expenditures.

A variety of approaches to meet and discuss were reported including formal sessions with the board (31%), informal sessions with the board (26%), sessions with the superintendent (34%), and no process (9%). During plan development, nealy one-half of the respondents felt that their board merely complied with the law while one-fourth of the principals noted support for a management team philosophy. Approximately 22 percent of the respondents viewed board posture as allowing little meaningful input and 5 percent of the administrators concluded that school boards manipulated or avoided the legislative mandate.

As indicated in Table 1, several significant correlations existed among demographic and attitudinal variables. Board loyalty and pay satisfaction related to such factors as district size, aid ratio, and certain personal traits of the principal. The negative correlation between aid ratio and board loyalty suggested that the lowest loyalty scores were associated with districts experiencing depressed measures of local wealth (high aid ratio). Correlation analysis, too, revealed that higher levels of pay satisfaction were associated with older, more experienced, and presumably better paid school principals.

Table 1 further indicated significant intercorrela-

Table 1

Correlations Among Demographic, Procedural, and Attitudinal Variables (N=324)

Variable	Board Loyalty	Supt. Loyalty	Pay Sat.	M/D Sat.	Pre-M/D Sat
Demographic Variables					
Aid Ratio	-.14 **	.06	-.01	-.01	.09
Dist. Enroll.	.11	.05	.09	.07	.15 *
Build. Enroll.	-.02	-.03	.05	.06	.03
Present Age	.06	-.02	.16 **	-.03	.01
Years Admin.	.05	-.03	.12 *	.01	.08
Years Pos.	.14 **	.03	.14 **	-.04	.04
Staff Supv.	-.01	-.12 *	.08	.07	.07
No. Admin.	.16 **	.01	.12 *	.09	.10
Salary	.25 **	.05	.41 **	.11	.16 *
Procedural Variables					
Process	-.16 **	-.11	-.04	-.29 **	-.08
Spirit	-.50 **	-.31 **	-.35 **	-.68 **	-.35 **
Prin. Prep	.14 *	.05	.01	.05	-.11
Team Prep	-.01	-.21 *	-.01	-.18 *	-.07
Prin. M/D	.10	.02	-.03	-.06	-.16 *
Team M/D	-.04	-.13	-.01	-.12	-.07
Attitudinal Variables					
Board Loyal.	1.00	.57 **	.49 **	.55 **	.37 **
Supt. Loyal.		1.00	.31 **	.38 **	.12 *
Pay Sat.			1.00	.47 **	.34 **
M/D Sat.				1.00	.51 **
Pre- M/D Sat.					1.00

* Significant beyond the .05 confidence level
** Significant beyond the .01 confidence level

tions among procedural and attitudinal variables. Strong relationships were discovered between all attitudinal variables and board spirit. Given the employed data coding scheme, a negative correlation suggested that higher attitudinal mean scores related to a posture supporting management team philosophy. Similarly, the use of formal meet and discuss channels (coded value=1) correlated with higher board loyalty scores. And, as noted in Table 1, intercorrelations among attitudinal variables disclosed strong positive relationships.

Although unreported in Table 1, demographics were not significantly related to the meet and discuss process but, in a few scattered instances, district size and the principal's age or experience impacted upon time variables. Other findings revealed that district size, the principal's experience, and salary significantly correlated with board posture.

PARTICIPATION AND SATISFACTION

In general, principal satisfaction with self-interest interactions provided solid support for the use of a state-mandated meet and discuss model of pay design.

For every dissatisfied principal, two principals expressed either satisfaction or high satisfaction with their experiences. Furthermore, only 2 out of 10 principals in this study appeared uncertain about the satisfying nature of meet and discuss. In contrast, 41 percent of respondents reported dissatisfying experiences with pay

design activities conducted under voluntary conditions that preceded mandatory meet and discuss. When combined with 19 percent of the principals who expressed uncertainty, nearly 6 out of 10 principals held reservations about compensation development in a voluntary climate. Findings in this study were consistent with research conducted by PAESP (1988) and Caldwell (1987) regarding principal satisfaction with meet and discuss.

Positive attitudes toward the organization complimented expressions of procedural satisfaction. In Table 2, principal perceptions of organizational loyalty and satisfaction were reported in percentages of response. Over 6 out of 10 principals expressed satisfying work relationships with school boards while a slightly smaller percentage declared extreme loyalty to the board. Nearly 7 out of 10 principals reported high levels of trust and confidence in the superintendent. Finally, approximately 6 out of 10 principals believed that their pay was fair compared to other district principals. However, the data revealed a perception that teachers within the system and principals across the Commonwealth received more equitable pay treatment.

These findings are important to legislators, educational researchers, and practicing administrators. Satisfying, trusting, and loyal relationships between middle and top management contribute to more positive and productive school climates. In the shift from a voluntary climate

Table 2

Measures of Organizational Loyalty and Satisfaction
(N=334)

Attitudinal Measures	Percent of Responses * A	U	D **
Loyalty To The School Board			
1. My Board of Education is frequently responsible for mistakes which occur in my building.	16	12	72
2. I cannot place a high degree of confidence and trust in our school board members.	35	20	45
3. I feel extremely loyal to my board of education.	57	22	21
4. All in all, I am satisfied working for the members of the board of education in our school system.	64	20	16
Loyalty To The Superintendent			
1. Generally speaking, I have a high level of trust and confidence in my superintendent.	69	17	14
2. Superintendents at times must make decisions which seem to be against the current interests of principals. When this happens to me, I feel I can trust my superintendent's decision is in my best interest.	54	24	22
3. My superintendent is frequently responsible for mistakes which occur in my building.	15	11	74
4. If I had a chance to work as a principal for the same pay in another school under the direction of a different superintendent, I would immediately move.	11	20	69
Pay Satisfaction			
1. My current salary is fair when compared to other principals in my district.	59	8	33
2. My current salary is fair when compared to teachers' salaries in my own school.	39	12	49
3. My salary is fair when compared with principals across the Commonwealth.	34	21	45

* Percents may not equal 100 due to rounding.

** A = Agreement, U = Uncertainty, D = Disagreement

marked by wide variability in participative opportunity, to a mandated meet and discuss condition characterized by a minimal level of guaranteed participation, pay design interactions contributed to satisfying experiences for most school principals.

A closer examination of the data, however, revealed that two factors significantly influenced principals' attitudes of loyalty and satisfaction. The highest levels of loyalty and satisfaction were related to formal or informal meet and discuss procedures and the school board's "good faith" attitude or spirit during pay discussions.

FORMAL AND INFORMAL INTERACTION

Meet and discuss conditions offered a valuable opportunity to assess the effects of formal and informal board-principal interactions when wages, salaries, or fringe benefits were under discussion.

Given the mandate's simplicity, districts permitted various forms of input ranging from formal sessions between boards and principals to a complete lack of principal input. Informal meetings between principals, school boards, or superintendents also occurred.

Data in Tables 3 and 4 underscored the importance of formal and informal interactions. Table 3 reported one-way analysis of variance and Tukey contrast data for the variable of board loyalty. An F-ratio of 10.62 (p=.0001) indicated highly significant relationships between input channels and expressions of loyalty toward the school board.

Table 3

Summary, One-Way Analysis of Variance, and Tukey Contrast Data: Principal Perceptions of Board Loyalty by Procedural Classification (N=331)

Process	Number	Mean	Standard Deviation
I. Formal Meet/Discuss	103	14.2524	3.7592
II. Informal Meet/Discuss	89	14.6180	3.1280
III. Superintendent Sessions	111	14.3514	3.7554
IV. No Process	28	10.4286	3.6355

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F Ratio	P	
Between Groups	410.189	3	136.729	10.62	.0001	**
Within Groups	4210.602	327	12.878			
Total	4620.792	330				

Tukey Method: Pair-Wise Contrasts

Groups	Difference	df	T-Value	P	
I & II	.3656	327	.704	.482	
I & III	.0989	327	.202	.840	
I & IV	-3.8239	327	-5.000	.001	*
II & III	-.2666	327	-.522	.602	
II & IV	-4.1894	327	-5.388	.001	*
III & IV	-3.9228	327	-5.169	.001	*

* Significant beyond the .01 confidence level
** Significant beyond the .05 confidence level

Table 4

Summary, One-Way Analysis of Variance, and Tukey Contrast Data: Principal Perceptions of Superintendent Loyalty by Procedural Classifications (N=329)

Process	Number	Mean	Standard Deviation
I. Formal Meet/Discuss	101	15.2772	3.5612
II. Informal Meet/Discuss	89	15.5169	3.0641
III. Superintendent Sessions	110	15.0545	3.7511
IV. No Process	29	13.3793	4.3459

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F Ratio	P	
Between Groups	104.7273	3	34.9091	2.7293	.0440	*
Within Groups	4156.9627	325	12.7907			
Total	4261.6900	328				

Tukey Method: Pair-Wise Contrasts

Groups	Difference	df	T-Value	P	
I & II	.2396	325	.461	.645	
I & III	-.2227	325	-.452	.652	
I & IV	-1.8979	325	-2.519	.012	*
II & III	-.4623	325	-.907	.365	
II & IV	-2.1375	325	-2.795	.005	**
III & IV	-1.6752	325	-2.244	.026	*

* Significant beyond the .05 confidence level
** Significant beyond the .01 confidence level

The highest mean loyalty score was associated with informal board sessions followed in descending order by superintendent sessions, formal meet and discuss, and the lack of participative opportunity. Tukey contrast data revealed that all channels of input, formal or informal, were significantly related to higher mean scores for board loyalty when compared to no input process.

In Table 4, similar findings occurred for the variable of principal loyalty to the superintendent. Results from one-way analysis of variance (F-ratio=2.7293; p=.04) revealed significant relationships between input channels. The highest mean score was recorded for informal meet and discuss sessions with the board followed closely by formal board sessions and meetings with the superintendent. Once again, Tukey follow-up indicated that superintendent loyalty was significantly higher for districts in which formal and informal procedures were used juxtaposed to a denial of principal participation.

In the case of pay satisfaction, however, different results were obtained. One-way analysis of variance produced an F-ratio of 1.4993 (p=.2146) indicating that significant relationships did not exist between various input channels. The highest mean score in pay satisfaction was recorded for informal board sessions (9.1461) along with superintendent meetings (9.0088), formal board sessions (8.7576), and no process (7.7143). Although higher mean

scores were obtained for formal and informal interactions, the lack of statistical significance suggested that differences were due to random chance or error.

The import of these findings should not go unnoticed. If top management seeks more satisfied and loyal administrators in charge of buiding operations, granting principals access to formal and informal discussion channels during pay design can be an effective means toward such an end. In this study, and regardless of salary level, an increase in participative opportunity was associated with positive expressions of board and superintendent loyalty. And, as Kirkwood (1986) reported in a study of administrator perceptions toward unionism, the manner in which school administrators view superintendents and boards of education exerts a major influence on their attitudes toward middle management unionization.

BOARD SPIRIT

Principals' attitudes of loyalty were also related to a second key factor; namely, the school board's "good faith" attitude demonstrated during compensation development.

To measure this factor, respondents were required to select a statement best describing the school board spirit. Choices ranged from support for management team philosophy to manipulation or avoidance of the law.

Data in Tables 5-7 confirmed the crucial nature of board spirit or posture. A school board's "good faith"

Table 5

Summary, One-Way Analysis of Variance, and Tukey Contrast Data: Principal Perceptions of Board Loyalty by Spirit Classifications (N=325)

Spirit	Number	Mean	Standard Deviation
I. Supported Management Team Philosophy	80	16.4500	3.0436
II. Complied with Intent of the Law	159	14.2893	3.1509
III. Allowed Little Input	72	11.9583	3.7093
IV. Manipulated or Avoided the Law	14	8.8571	3.1831

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F Ratio	P	
Between Groups	1162.2912	3	387.4304	36.4806	.0001	**
Within Groups	3409.0811	321	10.6202			
Total	4571.3723	324				

Tukey Method: Pair-Wise Contrasts

Groups	Difference	df	T-Value	P	
I & II	-2.1607	321	-4.837	.001	*
I & III	-4.4917	321	-8.485	.001	*
I & IV	-7.5929	321	-8.042	.001	*
II & III	-2.3310	321	-5.035	.001	*
II & IV	-5.4322	321	-5.979	.001	*
III & IV	-3.1012	321	-3.258	.001	*

* Significant beyond the .001 confidence level
** Significant beyond the .0001 confidence level

Table 6

Summary, One-Way Analysis of Variance, and Tukey Contrast Data: Principal Perceptions of Superintendent Loyalty by Spirit Classifications (N=323)

	Spirit	Number	Mean	Standard Deviation
I.	Supported Management Team Philosophy	81	16.5802	3.2934
II.	Complied with Intent of the Law	156	15.2179	3.2928
III.	Allowed Little Input	71	13.5352	3.7714
IV.	Manipulated or Avoided the Law	15	13.2667	3.9182

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F Ratio	P	
Between Groups	403.9168	3	134.6388	11.4261	.0001	***
Within Groups	3758.9134	319	11.7834			
Total	4162.8297	322				

Tukey Method: Pair-Wise Contrasts

Groups	Difference	df	T-Value	P	
I & II	-1.3623	319	-2.898	.004	**
I & III	-3.0450	319	-5.456	.001	**
I & IV	-3.3136	319	-3.434	.001	**
II & III	-1.6827	319	-3.424	.001	**
II & IV	-1.9513	319	-2.103	.036	*
III & IV	-.2685	319	-.275	.783	

* Significant beyond the .05 confidence level
** Significant beyond the .01 confidence level
*** significant beyond the .0001 confidence level

Table 7

Summary, One-Way Analysis of Variance, and Tukey Contrast Data:
Principal Perceptions of Pay Satisfaction
by Spirit Classifications
(N=324)

	Spirit	Number	Mean	Standard Deviation
I.	Supported Management Team Philosophy	80	10.2625	3.2089
II.	Complied with Intent of the Law	155	9.0323	3.0588
III.	Allowed Little Input	74	7.5676	2.9798
IV.	Manipulated or Avoided the Law	15	5.8667	3.1137

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F Ratio	P	
Between Groups	419.9604	3	139.9868	14.7441	.0001	**
Within Groups	3038.2217	320	9.4944			
Total	3458.1821	323				

Tukey Method: Pair-Wise Contrasts

Groups	Difference	df	T-Value	P	
I & II	-1.2302	320	-2.900	.004	*
I & III	-2.6949	320	-5.423	.001	*
I & IV	-4.3958	320	-5.070	.001	*
II & III	-1.4647	320	-3.364	.001	*
II & IV	-3.1656	320	-3.799	.001	*
III & IV	-1.7009	320	-1.949	.052	

* Significant beyond the .01 level
** Significant beyond the .001 level

attitude during plan development was significantly related to the principal's loyalty to the school board, pay satisfaction, and loyalty to the superintendent. Indeed, these findings were among the strongest identified in the study.

One-way analysis of variance for board loyalty (Table 5) generated an F-ratio of 36.4806 that was significant at the .0001 confidence level. The highest mean loyalty score registered for support provided management team philosophy (16.4500) followed directly by compliance with the law (14.2893), allowed little input (11.9583), and manipulation/avoidance of the law (8.8571). Tukey follow-up suggested that a board posture supportive of management team structures was clearly associated with the highest levels of board loyalty. Negative influences developed and contributed to reduced levels of loyalty when mere compliance or outright manipualtion and avoidance of the legislative mandate occurred.

In Tables 6 and 7, one-way analysis of variance and Tukey contrasts for superintendent loyalty and pay satisfaction were reported. Similar findings occurred although no significant differences existed between a board posture that allowed little input or one that manupulated/avoided the law. An F-ratio of 11.4261 (p=.0001) was noted in Table 6 for loyalty to the superintendent. Mean loyalty scores for management team support (16.5801) and compliance with the law (15.2179) were significantly different from those obtained for allowed little input (13.5332) or manipulation

and avoidance (13.2667). In Table 7, statistical analysis (F-ratio=14.7441; p=.0001) highlighted the importance of a positive approach to pay design. Mean pay satisfaction scores for management team support (10.2625) and compliance with the law (9.0588) were significantly higher than the categories of allowed little input (7.5676) or manipulation/ avoidance of the law (5.8667).

Board posture during pay design is an important factor. As noted in the above analysis, a clear perception by principals that school boards support management team structures does exert a powerful and significant influence over principal attitudes of organizational loyalty and pay satisfaction. The conjunctive effect of formal/informal participative procedures and board support for team management engendered positive attitudes by middle management toward superiors and top management. Optimal levels of trust, satisfaction, and loyalty can be expected under such conditions. And, trusting, satisfied, and loyal administrators contribute to the growth of positive school climates.

TIME SPENT

Finally, the amount of time spent by principals and principal teams in preparation for or interaction with meet and discuss activities was examined in this study.

The time variable was reported as the actual number of hours expended by administrators in preparation or discussion during pay design. Nearly 90 percent of the principals spent between 1 and 12 hours preparing for meet and discuss

while expending between 1-6 hours in meet and discuss interactions. Team preparation ranged between 1-18 hours for preparation and 1-8 hours in pay discussions.

Of the various relationships examined, attitudinal variables were not significantly related to the amount of time spent by principals or principal teams in preparation for meet and discuss. Additionally, the number of hours spent by principals in pay discussions revealed no significant relationships. Superintendent loyalty and time spent, however, were significantly related. One-way analysis of variance produced an F-ratio of 3.1866 that was significant at the .Ø4 confidence level. Further analysis is required before one may draw firmer conclusions.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Should school administrators actively participate in self-interest wage and benefit determinations? What benefits accrue for the administrator? And, will participative pay design enhance the school organization?

The findings of this study confirmed the benefits of administrator participation in personal pay decisions. Increased opportunity for input through formal and informal meet and discuss channels was associated with higher levels of principal satisfaction and loyalty toward the organization. And, satisfied and loyal administrators are essential elements that, in the years ahead, school boards and superintendents need to cultivate in order to improve our nation's schools.

Specifically, data in this study supported three firm conclusions. First, the Pennsylvania meet and discuss model provided a viable alternative to single-minded board decision making in pay design and collective bargaining. Higher satisfaction levels with mandatory meet and discuss were expressed by principals juxtaposed to principal satisfaction with experiences under prior voluntary conditions. Growth and refinement of the model rather than abandonment appears to be the likely furture scenario (Lebda, 1986b). Strained, bureaucratic, advesarial, or other dysfunctional relationships failed to materialize as the level of administrator involvement increased thereby discounting the expectations of Smith (1973b), Kanner (1977), Karlitz (1978), or Hahn (1981).

Second, management team concepts and formal/informal interaction between administrators and school boards are compatible. Despite reservations described by Anderson (1969), Salmon (1972), Sinclair (1977), Nasstrom & Pier (1983), or Mayher (1984), an increase in formal or informal input by principals can strengthen the administrative team. Indeed, the strongest finding in this study suggested that principal perceptions of a school board's posture during compensation development was significantly related to the highest levels of administrator loyalty and satisfaction. For those cases in which board posture supported manage-

ment team philosophy, positive attitudes were expressed by school principals. Given the strong, positive correlation ($r=.40$; $p=.001$) between process and board posture, expanded administrator involvement can strengthen management team relationships.

Finally, data in this study supported a growing body of literature advocating worker participation in organizational decision making including personal welfare issues. Consistent with private sector research (Lawler, 1975; Jenkins & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, 1985) and studies of the principalship (LeCesne, 1981; Caldwell & Paul, 1983a; Kirkwood, 1984; Williams, 1985), the present study revealed evidence that principal participation in pay design is associated with more positive attitudes toward top management and the school organization. School boards need to recognize that optimal administrator performance is related to the principal's sense of satsifaction, status, and recognition, which is a view consonant with decision making and motivation theory (Maslow, 1954; Likert, 1961; Herzberg, 1966; Alderfer, 1972; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). By addressing the personal welfare concerns of principals through participative channels, school boards will take an important step toward retaining competent administrators and attracting talented replacements who may otherwise seek fulfillment of their higher order needs through other career opportunities.

A continued research agenda, however, is warranted. Five directions should be pursued. First, comparative

studies through a variety of methodological approaches in the private and public sectors will contribute to a greater understanding of those conditions that further stimulate enhanced middle-manager, trust, morale, loyalty, and satisfaction. Second, the finite dimensions of participative procedures need to be investigated more thoroughly so that the full range of practical applications may be identified. Third, future research would benefit from studies that examine relationships between principal perceptions during pay design and subsequent job performance. Fourth, empirical inquiry should focus on the implications of expanded administrator involvement for the traditional role played by school superintendents. Finally, the limits of administrator participation in pay design require further exploration. Cardone (1987), in a study of 274 principals in the volatile educational climate of Texas, reported two seemingly contradictory findings. Participative procedures were not significantly related to organizational attitudes, but principal commitment to the organization was associated with the use of formal, written board agreements or comprehensive policy statements. Since many of the studies supporting greater principal input were conducted in labor intensive states or regions of the nation, different relationships may exist in areas with a long history of "right to work" attitudes or a turbulent political climate focusing on professional accountability issues.

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